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Abstract
The goal of an auction is to determine commodity prices such that all participants are perfectly
happy. Such a solution is called a competitive equilibrium and does not exist in general. For this
reason we are interested in solutions which are similar to a competitive equilibrium.
The article introduces two relaxations of a competitive equilibrium for general auctions. Both
relaxations determine one price per commodity by solving a difficult non-convex optimization prob-
lem. The first model is a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC), which ensures
that each participant is either perfectly happy or his bid is rejected. An exact algorithm and a heuris-
tic are provided for this model. The second model is a relaxation of the first one and only ensures
that no participant incurs a loss. In an optimal solution to the second model, no participant can be
made better off without making another one worse off.
Keywords: game theory; auctions/bidding; integer programming; nonlinear programming; MPEC
AMS Subject Classifications: 90C11; 90C33; 91A46; 91B15; 91B26
Outline
Section 1 provides a brief introduction to auctions, bid expression, strict linear pricing schedules, and
surplus maximization. Section 2 provides definitions for quasi-linear utility, competitive equilibria, and
extends these concepts by introducing decision sets, quantity functions, and decision valuations. With
these extensions, it becomes convenient to apply the definitions to real-world optimization problems.
Section 3 introduces the fundamental welfare theorem: under certain convexity assumptions, the sur-
plus maximizing solution admits a strict linear pricing schedule, at which the individual optimization
problems of each participant are maximized. Difficulties arise when some of the bids are non-convex
and the auction determines exactly one price per tradable commodity. Section 4 addresses these diffi-
culties and introduces two relaxations of a competitive equilibrium. Section 4.1 proposes a model and
an exact algorithm that maximizes the economic surplus such that the individual optimization problem
of a bid is either maximized or the bid is rejected. Section 4.2 introduces a model that maximizes the
economic surplus such that no participant incurs a loss. The model computes an efficient solution,
that is, the surplus of one participant cannot be increased without decreasing the surplus of another
participant. In Section 4.3 we refer to a large scale real-world application.
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1 Introduction
In this chapter we will provide a general definition of an auction. An auction is coordinated by an
auctioneer. All auctions have in common that there is a non-empty set of buyers and a non-empty set of
sellers. Otherwise the outcome of the auction is trivial, as nothing can be traded. Furthermore, there is
a non-empty set of different tradable commodities and there might exist several interchangeable copies
of each commodity. Examples for commodities are company shares, futures contracts, electricity at a
specific location and time, and so on. In general it is difficult to distinguish between buyers and sellers,
as there might exist participants who just want to swap different commodities. Such a participant is a
buyer and a seller at once. For this reason we will use the term participants (also called bidders) instead
of buyers and sellers.
1.1 Bid Expression
The participants need to tell the auctioneer in which commodity bundles they are interested. In our
auction each participant submits a bid that represents his interests. A bid is determined by the following
bid parameters:
Definition 1. Let m be the number of tradable commodities. The bid of a participant i is determined by
his bid parameters (Di , vi , fi), where
• Di is the feasible region of his decision variables (hereinafter also referred to as decision set),
• vi : Di → R is his decision valuation function (benefit if > 0/ costs if < 0), and
• fi : Di → Rm is his quantity function.
In Subsection 1.4 we will see that these parameters describe individual optimization problems that
return the optimal demanded or supplied quantities depending on the commodity prices given by the
auctioneer. In De Vries & Vohra (2003) these individual optimization problems are called oracles.
Let (Di , vi , fi) be the bid parameters of a participant i. If δi ∈ Di , then δi is a feasible decision and
fi(δi) is the associated quantity vector in Rm. Positive values indicate that the participant demands
the specified amount of a good and negative values indicate that he supplies the specified amount of
a good. The value vi(δi) indicates the benefit (or cost) that is associated with the decision δi . If the
quantity function fi is injective on Di , then it assigns a unique benefit (or cost) to each commodity
bundle in fi(Di). However, we do not need to require injectivity.
1.2 Clearing Condition
Let M be the set of commodities, I be the set of participants, and (Di , vi , fi) be the bid parameters of
participants i ∈ I . A solution to an auction must satisfy at least the following two constraints:∑
i∈I
fi(δi) = 0, (1)
δi ∈ Di ∀i ∈ I . (2)
The first equation is called clearing condition and ensures that for each commodity the bought quantity
minus the sold quantity is equal to zero. The equality sign is important as the auctioneer is not inter-
ested in keeping any goods. In some auctions there is only one seller and the seller is the auctioneer.
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In this case we assume that the seller and the auctioneer are different parties. The seller will keep
the commodities which are not sold. The second equation ensures that the decision variables of each
participant are in the respective decision set.
1.3 Linear Pricing Schedules
Participants who supply a commodity will only participate in the auction if they receive money for
supplying a commodity. The money is to be collected from the participants who demand the commodity.
We will now define a common pricing schedule, which is a multidimensional extension of the definition
in (Tirole, 1988, p. 136).
Definition 2. Let m be the number of different commodities. A pricing schedule T : Rm → R is a map
that returns the total amount of money to be paid by a participant depending on his consumption vector
q ∈ Rm. A negative T (q) specifies the amount of money to be received and −qi bought units model qi sold
units of commodity i. A pricing schedule is called linear if the map is linear, i.e., T (q) = pi>q. In this case
pi is called a linear price vector and pii is the price per unit for commodity i.
Definition 3. A pricing schedule is strict linear if it is linear and the number of commodities m is equal to
the number of clearing conditions in the auction model (Van Vyve (2011)).
An example for a linear pricing schedule which is not strict linear can be found in O’Neill et al. (2005).
There, the number of commodities equals the number of clearing conditions plus the number of binary
variables.
1.4 Surplus Maximization
We assume that the auctioneer decides to implement a strict linear pricing schedule.
Definition 4. Let T be a strict linear pricing schedule and let (Di , vi , fi) be the bid parameters of partici-
pant i. Then his surplus depending on his decision variable δi ∈ Di is given by
vi(δi)− T ( fi(δi)).
The individual optimization problem, which maximizes his surplus, is given by
max{vi(δi)− T ( fi(δi)) | δi ∈ D}.
A participant is perfectly happy if his individual optimization problem is maximized. The sum of the
surpluses of all participants is called economic surplus or social welfare.
Note, that the surplus is non-negative whenever we have vi(δi) ≥ T ( fi(δi)). In other words if the
participant is a buyer, his surplus is non-negative whenever the benefit is greater or equal to the amount
of money to be paid. If he is a seller, the surplus is non-negative whenever −T ( fi(δi)) ≥ −vi(δi), i.e.,
whenever the amount of money to be received is greater or equal to the costs.
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Now assume that the auctioneer wants to maximize the economic surplus, subject to the clearing
condition and the feasibility of the decision variables:
max
∑
i∈I

vi(δi)−pi> fi(δi)

, (3)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
fi(δi) = 0, (4)
δi ∈ Di , ∀i ∈ I , (5)
pi ∈ Rm. (6)
Proposition 5. The following optimization problem is equal to (3)-(6).
max
∑
i∈I
vi(δi), (7)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
fi(δi) = 0, (8)
δi ∈ Di , ∀i ∈ I , (9)
pi ∈ Rm. (10)
Proof. Let (d,pi) be a feasible solution to (3)-(6). Equation (4) yields that the objective is given by∑
i∈I

vi(δi)−pi> fi(δi)

=
∑
i∈I
vi(δi)−
∑
i∈I
pi> fi(δi) =
∑
i∈I
vi(δi)−pi>
∑
i∈I
fi(δi) =
∑
i∈I
vi(δi).
Observe that pi can be chosen arbitrarily. The economic surplus is not depending on the values of
pi. If we choose arbitrary prices, then some of the participants might incur a loss, that is, they have a
negative surplus. Section 2 introduces the competitive equilibrium, a situation where all participants
are perfectly happy. In particular no participant incurs a loss. Section 3 shows that a competitive
equilibrium exists if the model (7)-(10) is convex. Section 4 addresses the non-convex case. There,
an optimal solution to (7)-(10) does not necessarily posses a strict linear pricing schedule where no
participant incurs a loss.
2 Economic Definitions and Generalizations
Definition 6. Let I be a finite set of auction participants and let L be a finite set of tradable commodities.
The first element in L will be called numéraire commodity and represents money. T := L \ {0} is the
set of tradable commodities without the numéraire commodity. A set X i ⊆ RL is called a quantity set of
participant i (also called consumption set / production set). A positive entry in a quantity vector x i ∈ X i
indicates that participant i receives the specified amount of that good, and a negative entry indicates that
he gives away the specified amount of that good. A function ui : X i → R is called a utility function of
participant i.
If a utility function has the form ui(w, q) = w+Φi(q) with Φi : RT → R, then it is called a quasi-linear
utility function. The function Φi is called valuation (also called benefit if ≥ 0 / cost if ≤ 0).
These definitions are consistent with Mas-Colell et al. (1995) and Blumrosen & Nisan (2007).
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Proposition 7. Let i be a consumer and let ui(w, q) = w +Φi(q) be his quasi-linear utility function. The
willingness to pay function Mi : RT → R that returns the amount of money the consumer is willing to pay
for the consumption of the bundle q ∈ RT is defined as
ui(w0−Mi(q), q) = ui(w0, 0).
If ui is quasi-linear and Φ(0) = 0, then we have Mi(q) = Φi(q) for all q ∈ RT , i.e., the willingness to pay
is equal to the benefit.
Definition 8. (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Def. 10.B.1) An allocation (x i)i∈I is a tuple of quantity vectors
x i ∈ X i for each participant (buyer/seller) i ∈ I .
Definition 9. (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Def. 10.B.3) An allocation (x∗i )i∈I and a price vector p∗ ∈ RL
constitute a competitive (Walrasian) equilibrium with respect to a strict linear pricing schedule if the
following conditions hold.
• Utility maximization for each participant:
∀i ∈ I : x∗i ∈ arg max
¦
ui(x i) | x i ∈ X i , (p∗)>x i ≤ 0
©
(11)
• Clearing condition for each commodity:
∀l ∈ L : ∑
i∈I
x∗i,l = 0 (12)
The constraint (p∗)>x i ≤ 0 is called the budget constraint of participant i. Note that the clearing condition
of money must hold in a competitive equilibrium because it is also a commodity in L.
Proposition 10. Let the utility functions of all participants i ∈ I be quasi-linear, i.e., ui(w, q) = w+Φi(q).
Let the quantity sets of all participants i ∈ I be given by X i = R×Q i with Q i ⊆ RT . Let the price of money
(the numéraire commodity) amount to p∗0 = 1 currency unit.
Then the allocation

(w∗i , q∗i )

i∈I and the price vector (1, p
∗
T ) ∈ RL constitute a competitive equilib-
rium with respect to a strict linear pricing schedule if and only if the following conditions hold.
• Utility maximization for each participant:
∀i ∈ I : q∗i ∈ argmax
¦
Φi(qi)− (p∗T )>qi | qi ∈Q i
©
(13)
∀i ∈ I : w∗i =−(p∗T )>q∗i (14)
• Clearing condition for each commodity: ∑
i∈I
w∗i = 0 (15)
∀t ∈ T : ∑
i∈I
q∗i,t = 0 (16)
If (14) and (16) are satisfied, then the clearing condition of money (15) is also satisfied.
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Proof. The utility maximization problem of each participant is given by
max wi +Φi(qi), (17)
s.t. p∗0wi + (p∗T )>qi ≤ 0, (18)
qi ∈Q i , (19)
wi ∈ R, (20)
where p∗0 = 1. At first we will show, that an optimal solution to (17)-(20) satisfies (13)-(14). Let
(w∗i , q∗i ) be an optimal solution to (17)-(20), then (−(p∗T )>q∗i , q∗i ) is a feasible solution to the same
problem and we have
w∗i +Φi(q∗i ) | (w∗i , q∗i ) maximizes (17)-(20),
≥−(p∗T )>q∗i +Φi(q∗i ) | (w∗i , q∗i ) satisfies (18): − (p∗T )>q∗i ≥ w∗i ,
≥ w∗i +Φi(q∗i ).
As the terms in the first and last row are equal, the inequalities are satisfied with equality. This yields
that w∗i = −(p∗T )>q∗i , thus (14) is satisfied. Let qi ∈ Q i be arbitrary, then (−(p∗T )>qi , qi) is feasible to
(17)-(20) and we have
Φi(q
∗
i )− (p∗T )>q∗i | (w∗i , q∗i ) satisfies (14),
= Φi(q
∗
i ) +w
∗
i | (w∗i , q∗i ) maximizes (17)-(20),
≥ Φi(qi)− (p∗T )>qi
This yields that q∗i is an optimal solution to max
¦
Φi(qi)− (p∗T )>qi | qi ∈Q i
©
, thus it satisfies (13).
We will now show, that a solution that satisfies (13)-(14) is an optimal solution to (17)-(20). Let
q∗i be an optimal solution to max
¦
Φi(qi)− (p∗T )>qi | qi ∈Q i
©
and let w∗i = −(p∗T )>q∗i . Let (wi , qi) be a
feasible solution to (17)-(20), then we have
Φi(q
∗
i ) +w
∗
i
= Φi(q
∗
i )− (p∗T )>q∗i | q∗i satisfies (13),
≥ Φi(qi)− (p∗T )>qi | (wi , qi) satisfies (18):− (p∗T )>qi ≥ wi ,
≥ Φi(qi) +wi .
This yields, that (w∗i , q∗i ) is an optimal solution to (17)-(20).
Let (14) and (16) be satisfied, then∑
i∈I
w∗i =−
∑
i∈I
(p∗T )>q∗i =−
∑
i∈I
∑
t∈T
p∗t q∗i,t =−
∑
t∈T
p∗t
∑
i∈I
q∗i,t = 0.
2.1 Decision Sets and Quantity Functions
In many cases it is convenient to express the valuation function Φi (cost ≤ 0 / benefit ≥ 0) with the
help of decision variables (control variables) instead of quantity variables. For this reason we introduce
the concept of quantity functions and valuation functions depending on decision variables.
Again, let L be the set of tradeable commodities including the numéraire and let T := L \{0} be the
set of commodities without the numéraire.
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Definition 11. Let i be a participant with a quasi-linear utility function ui(w, q) = w +Φi(q) and let his
quantity set be given by X i = R×Q i with Q i ⊆ RT . If there is a set Di ⊆ Rni , a function fi : Di → RT and
a function vi : Di → R such that
Q i = fi(Di) and
∀q ∈Q i : Φi(q) =max{vi(δ) | fi(δ) = q, δ ∈ Di}.
then Di is called decision set, fi is called quantity function, and vi is called decision valuation of partici-
pant i.
In Blumrosen & Nisan (2007) the evaluation of the quantity-parameterized optimization problem
Φi(q) =max{vi(δ) | fi(δ) = q, δ ∈ Di} is called a value query: “The auctioneer presents a bundle q, the
bidder reports his value Φi(q) [in numéraire units] for this bundle”. In a value query the participant has
to choose his decision variables such that he can buy / sell exactly the specified quantities ( fi(δ) = q).
Subject to this constraint he will choose his decision variables such that they maximize an individual
valuation function vi depending on his decision variables. Then he will return the optimal value to the
auctioneer. For example a producer will try to find the cheapest production schedule to produce the
quantities q. Then he will return the production costs (< 0) to the auctioneer.
Proposition 12. Let the utility functions of all participants i ∈ I be quasi-linear, i.e., ui(w, q) = w+Φi(q).
Let the quantity sets of all participants i ∈ I be given by X i = R×Q i with Q i ⊆ RT . Let Di ⊆ Rni be the
decision set, fi the quantity set, and vi the decision valuation of participant i ∈ I , that is,
Q i = fi(Di) and
∀q ∈Q i : Φi(q) =max{vi(δ) | fi(δ) = q, δ ∈ Di}.
Let the price of money (the numéraire commodity) amount to p∗0 = 1 currency unit.
Then the allocation

(w∗i , q∗i )

i∈I and the price vector (1, p
∗
T ) ∈ RL constitute a competitive equilib-
rium with respect to a strict linear pricing schedule if and only if the following conditions hold.
• Utility maximization for each participant:
∀i ∈ I : δ∗i ∈ argmax
¦
vi(δi)− (p∗T )> fi(δi) | δi ∈ Di
©
(21)
∀i ∈ I : q∗i = fi(δ∗i ) (22)
∀i ∈ I : w∗i =−(p∗T )>q∗i (23)
• Clearing condition for each commodity: ∑
i∈I
w∗i = 0 (24)
∀t ∈ T : ∑
i∈I
q∗i,t = 0 (25)
Remember that the clearing condition of money (24) is redundant and can be omitted.
Before we will proof this proposition we present a model transformation that holds in a general
setting. Similar to extended formulations the transformation allows us to express the feasible region
(quantity set) with the help of additional (or less) variables. The transformation also expresses the
objective with the help of these additional variables. This is extremely useful as it allows us to model
certain non-linear objectives with the help of mixed-integer-formulations.
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Theorem 13. Let Q ⊆ Rm and D ⊆ Rn be arbitrary sets and let Φ : Q→ R, v : D→ R, and f : D→ Q be
arbitrary functions with
f (D) =Q,
∀q ∈Q : Φ(q) =max{v(δ) | δ ∈ f −1(q)},
where f −1(q) := {δ ∈ D | f (δ) = q} is the fiber of f at q. Then we have
max
q∈Q Φ(q) =maxδ∈D v(δ),
arg max
q∈Q Φ(q) = f

arg max
δ∈D v(δ)

.
The next figure visualizes the relationship between the different sets and functions.
Q
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maxΦ(·)
))
D
argmax v(·)

max v(·)
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Φ
55
argmax v(D)foo
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Proof. In the following the sets of optimal solutions will be denoted by Q∗ := argmaxq∈QΦ(q) and
D∗ := arg maxδ∈D v(δ).
Q∗ ⊆ f (D∗) Let q∗ ∈Q∗, that is, Φ(q∗)≥ Φ(q) for all q ∈Q. The function Φ is finite at all points q ∈Q.
In particular Φ(q∗) is finite and there exists δ∗ ∈ f −1(q∗) with Φ(q∗) = v(δ∗). We want to show that δ∗
is in D∗. Let δ ∈ D be arbitrary, then δ ∈ f −1( f (δ)) holds.
v(δ) ≤︷ ︸︸ ︷
δ∈ f −1( f (δ))

max v(δ′)
s.t. δ′ ∈ f −1( f (δ))

= Φ( f (δ)) ≤︷ ︸︸ ︷
f (δ)∈Q
Φ(q∗) = v(δ∗).
Now we have δ∗ ∈ D∗.
Q∗ ⊇ f (D∗) Let δ∗ ∈ D∗, that is, v(δ∗)≥ v(δ) for all δ ∈ D. We know that f (δ∗) ∈Q and we want to
show that it is in Q∗. Let q ∈Q be arbitrary.
Φ( f (δ∗)) =

max v(δ)
s.t. δ ∈ f −1( f (δ∗))

=︷ ︸︸ ︷
δ∗∈ f −1( f (δ∗))

max v(δ)
s.t. δ ∈ D

≥

max v(δ)
s.t. δ ∈ f −1(q)

= Φ(q).
Now we have f (δ∗) ∈Q∗.
maxq∈QΦ(q) =maxδ∈D v(δ) Let δ∗ ∈ D∗ and q∗ ∈Q∗, then f (δ∗) ∈Q∗.
Φ(q∗) =︷ ︸︸ ︷
f (δ∗)∈Q∗
Φ( f (δ∗)) =

max v(δ)
s.t. δ ∈ f −1( f (δ∗))

=︷ ︸︸ ︷
δ∗∈ f −1( f (δ∗))

max v(δ)
s.t. δ ∈ D

= v(δ∗).
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Corollary 14. Let Q ⊆ Rm and D ⊆ Rn be arbitrary sets and let Φ : Q→ R, v : D→ R, f : D→ Q, and
g : Q→ R be arbitrary functions with
f (D) =Q,
∀q ∈Q : Φ(q) =max{v(δ) | δ ∈ f −1(q)},
where f −1(q) := {δ ∈ D | f (δ) = q} is the fiber of f at q. Then we have
max
q∈Q Φ(q)− g(q) =maxδ∈D v(δ)− g( f (δ)), (26)
arg max
q∈Q Φ(q)− g(q) = f

argmax
δ∈D v(δ)− g( f (δ))

. (27)
Proof. Let eΦ(q) := Φ(q)− g(q) and ev(δ) := v(δ)− g( f (δ)). For all q ∈Q we have
eΦ(q) = Φ(q)− g(q)
=

max v(δ)
s.t. δ ∈ f −1(q)

− g(q) | g(q) is not depending on δ,
=

max v(δ)− g(q)
s.t. δ ∈ f −1(q)

| q = f (δ) holds for all δ ∈ f −1(q),
=

max ev(δ)
s.t. δ ∈ f −1(q)

.
We can now apply Theorem 13 to the functions eΦ, ev, and f .
Proof of Prop. 12. The notation of Proposition 12 is consistent with the notation of Corollary 14. We
only need to define the function g(q) := (p∗T )>q. The left hand side of equation (27) is equivalent to
equation (13) whereas the right hand side of (27) is equivalent to (21) and (22).
We are now ready to introduce a succinct definition of a competitive equilibrium that only involves
decision sets and quantity functions. The definition is consistent with the previous definitions and
propositions. In particular it is consistent with Proposition 12.
Definition 15. Let T be the set of tradable commodities without the numéraire. Let Di ⊆ Rni be the
decision set, fi : Di → RT the quantity function, and vi : Di → R the decision valuation of participant
i ∈ I . Remember that participant i has a quasi linear utility function.
Then the tuple (δ∗)i∈I and the price vector p∗ ∈ RT constitute a competitive equilibrium with respect
to a strict linear pricing schedule if and only if the following three conditions hold.
• Utility maximization for each participant:
∀i ∈ I : δ∗i ∈ argmax
¦
vi(δi)− (p∗)> fi(δi) | δi ∈ Di
©
(28)
• Strict Linear Pricing Schedule:
∀i ∈ I : w∗i :=−(p∗)> fi(δ∗i ) (29)
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• Clearing condition for each commodity in T:∑
i∈I
fi(δ
∗
i ) = 0 (30)
The term fi(δ∗i ) is the quantity vector of participant i and w∗i is the amount of money to be payed (< 0) or
received (> 0). The clearing condition of money
∑
i∈I w∗i = 0 is implied by (29) and (30).
3 Competitive Equilibria in Convex Auctions
In this section we study a fundamental property of convex auctions. A convex auction is an auction
where all participants submit convex bid parameters. If the auction is convex then we are able to find
a competitive equilibrium by just solving a convex optimization problem.
In the previous sections the individual optimization problems of the participants where expressed
with the help of the bid parameters (Di , vi , fi): the decision set, the decision valuation, and the quantity
function. This time we will assume that all participants express their bids by submitting convex bid
parameters:
Definition 16. Let T be the set of commodities without the numéraire. The bid parameters (Di , vi , fi) of
a participant i are convex if the decision valuation vi : Di → R is concave and differentiable, the quantity
function fi : Di → RT is affine and the decision set is given by
Di = {δi ∈ Rni | gi,k(δi)≤ 0 for k = 1, . . . , mi},
where gi,k : Rni → R are convex differentiable functions. We will use the tuple (gi , vi , fi) to denote convex
bid parameters. A bid is convex if its parameters are convex.
Theorem 17 (First Fundamental Welfare Theorem). Let T be the set of commodities without the
numéraire. Let the bids of all participants i ∈ I be expressed by convex bid parameters (gi , vi , fi) and
let the weak Slater assumption hold for the constraints (32)-(33).
Then the tuple (δ∗i )i∈I and the price vector pi∗ ∈ RT constitute a competitive equilibrium with respect
to a strict linear pricing schedule if and only if δ∗ is an optimal solution to
max
∑
i∈I
vi(δi), (31)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
fi(δi) = 0 [pi], (32)
δi ∈ Di [λi] ∀i ∈ I , (33)
and (pi∗,λ∗) is an optimal dual solution. pi is the dual variable to the clearing condition and λi,k is the
dual variable to the decision set constraints gi,k(δi) ≤ 0. An optimal solution to this problem is called a
welfare maximizing solution.
Proof. As the weak Slater assumption holds for (32)-(33) it also holds for the individual optimization
problems (28). This yields that in both cases the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient to describe
optimal solutions. The proof is basically a straightforward reformulation of the KKT conditions.
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At first we write out the optimization problem (31)-(33) in detail:
max
∑
i∈I
vi(δi),
s.t.
∑
i∈I
fi,t(δi) = 0 [pit] ∀t ∈ T ,
gi,k(δi)≤ 0 [λi,k] ∀i ∈ I , k = 1, . . . , mi ,
δi, j ∈ R ∀i ∈ I , j = 1, . . . , ni .
A solution δ∗ is optimal to this problem if and only if there exist variables pi∗ and λ∗ such that∑
i∈I
fi,t(δ
∗
i ) = 0 ∀t ∈ T , (34)
gi,k(δ
∗
i )≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I , k = 1, . . . , mi , (35)∑
t∈T
pi∗t
∂ fi,t
∂ δi, j
(δ∗i ) +
mi∑
k=1
λ∗i,k
∂ gi,k
∂ δi, j
(δ∗i ) =
∂ vi
∂ δi, j
(δ∗i ) ∀i ∈ I , j = 1, . . . , ni , (36)
λ∗i,k ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I , k = 1, . . . , mi , (37)
gi,k(δ
∗
i )λ
∗
i,k = 0 ∀i ∈ I , k = 1, . . . , mi . (38)
Equations (35), (36)-(37), and (38) correspond to the primal feasibility, the dual feasibility, and the
complementarity condition of the individual optimization problems (28). This yields the following
reformulation:∑
i∈I
fi,t(δ
∗
i ) = 0 ∀t ∈ T ,
δ∗i ∈ argmax vi(δi)−
∑
t∈T pi∗t fi,t(δi)
s.t. gi,k(δi)≤ 0 ∀k = 1, . . . , mi

∀i ∈ I .
Note that the price pi∗ is an exogenously given parameter in the individual optimization problem. In
other words: ∑
i∈I
fi,t(δ
∗
i ) = 0 ∀t ∈ T ,
δ∗i ∈ argmax{vi(δi)−pi∗> fi(δi) | δi ∈ Di} ∀i ∈ I .
These two equations in conjunction with the linear pricing schedule w∗i := −pi∗> fi(δ∗i ) for all partici-
pants i ∈ I yield that δ∗ and the price vector pi∗ constitute a competitive equilibrium with respect to a
strict linear pricing schedule.
4 Competitive Equilibrium Relaxations in Non-Convex Auctions
The previous section introduced the fundamental welfare theorem that allows us to compute a com-
petitive equilibrium in a convex auction by solving a convex optimization problem. As soon as at least
one participant submits non-convex bid parameters, the auction becomes non-convex. In such cases a
competitive equilibrium with respect to a strict linear pricing schedule might not exist, as the following
example shows.
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Example 18. There is one buyer and one seller. The buyer wants to buy at most one quantity unit
and his benefit per unit amounts to four currency units per quantity unit. He submits the convex bid
parameters (D0 = [0, 1], v0(δ0) = 4δ0, f0(δ0) = δ0). The seller wants to sell exactly two units or no
unit at all and his cost per quantity unit amounts to three currency units per quantity unit. He submits
the non-convex bid parameters (D1 = {−2,0}, v1(δ1) = 3δ1, f1(δ1) = δ1). The only feasible solution
is δ0 = δ1 = 0. We will see that there is no price pi0 such that the tuple of decision vectors (δ0,δ1) and
the price pi0 constitute a competitive equilibrium: If the price is strictly lower than four currency units,
then the optimal strategy of the buyer is to buy exactly one unit which is not possible. If the price is
strictly greater than three currency units, then the optimal strategy of the seller is to sell exactly two
units which is not possible. Even though the solution is not a competitive equilibrium, we can observe
that at least no participant incurs a loss.
Regardless of whether a competitive equilibrium exists or not, we can determine a welfare maxi-
mizing solution by solving the model in Theorem 17. However the next example shows that a welfare
maximizing solution does not necessarily admit a strict linear pricing schedule where no participant
incurs a loss.
Example 19. There are two buyers and one seller. Buyer 1 wants to buy at most one unit if the price
is lower or equal to four. Buyer 2 wants to buy at most two units if the price is lower or equal to six.
Seller 1 wants to sell exactly three or no units if the price is greater or equal to five.
buyer 1 : (D1 = [0, 1], v1(δ1) = 4δ1, f1(δ1) = δ1),
buyer 2 : (D2 = [0, 2], v2(δ2) = 6δ2, f2(δ2) = δ2),
seller 1 : (D3 = {−3,0}, v3(δ3) = 5δ3, f3(δ3) = δ3).
max 4δ1+ 6δ2+ 5δ3,
s.t. δ1+δ2+δ3 = 0,
δ1 ∈ [0, 1],
δ2 ∈ [0, 2],
δ3 ∈ {−3,0}.
The welfare maximizing solution (δ∗1,δ∗2,δ∗3) is (1,2,−3). If the price pi0 is strictly greater than four,
then buyer 1 incurs a loss, as he is only willing to pay at most four CU/QU (currency units per quantity
unit). If the price is strictly less than five, then seller 1 incurs a loss, as he wants to receive at least five
CU/QU.
As shown by the previous examples, a competitive equilibrium might not exist and a welfare maxi-
mizing solution does not necessarily admit a strict linear pricing schedule, where no participant incurs
a loss. This implies that in general there is no (δ,pi) such that∑
i∈I
fi,t(δi) = 0 ∀t ∈ T ,
δi ∈ argmax{vi(δ′i)−pi> fi(δ′i) | δ′i ∈ Di} ∀i ∈ I .
In practice a lot of exchanges facilitate the participants to submit non-convex bid parameters. A popular
non-convex bid in stock exchanges is the so called fill-or-kill limit order. The sell order in Example 18
is such a non-convex fill-or-kill limit order, whereas the buy order is a convex limit order. In other
words the example is a small auction at a stock exchange and it shows that in general stock exchanges
cannot publish execution schedules and strict linear prices that constitute a competitive equilibrium.
In fact most of the exchanges are publishing strict linear prices. This implies that they relax some of
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the optimality conditions of the individual optimization problems to make the previous optimization
problem feasible. It is clear that there are various possibilities for relaxing optimality conditions and
for choosing a solution within these newly introduced degrees of freedom.
We will present two closely related approaches. The first one shows that it is sufficient to relax some
of the optimality conditions: the execution state of a non-convex bid either maximizes the individual
surplus or the bid is rejected. The second approach is a pragmatic one: it ensures that the surplus of
non-convex bids is non-negative.
4.1 Model A: Individual Surplus Maximization or Rejection
Again let T be the set of commodities without the numéraire. Let I = IC ∪˙IN be the set of all bids,
at which IC is the set of convex bids and IN is the set of non-convex bids. The bid parameters of bid
i ∈ IC ∪ IN are denoted by (Di , vi , fi). Consider the model
max
∑
i∈I
vi(δi), (MainMPEC)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
fi,t(δi) = 0 ∀t ∈ T , (39)
δi ∈ arg max{vi(δ′i)−pi> fi(δ′i) | δ′i ∈ Di} ∀i ∈ IC , (40)
δi ∈ arg max{vi(δ′i)−pi> fi(δ′i) | δ′i ∈ Di} ∪ ker fi ∀i ∈ IN . (41)
The Greek letters δ and pi denote the variables of the model. If there are only convex bids, then
IN = ; and equations (39)-(40) sufficiently describe a welfare maximizing solution. In equation (41)
we extended the feasible region by adding the kernel of the quantity functions. This relaxation enables
us to reject non-convex bids independent of the prices pi: If the decision variables of the non-convex
bids are in the kernel of the respective quantity function (i.e., δi ∈ ker fi for i ∈ IN ), then in the clearing
condition (39) the term fi,t(δi) vanishes for all non-convex bids i ∈ IN . This yields that the model is
feasible if there is a solution that only involves the convex bids. If for example for each convex bid
there is a feasible decision vector such that the quantity function maps to zero (i.e., ker fi ∩ Di 6= ; for
i ∈ IC), then the model is feasible.
In example 18 the model would select a solution that satisfies δ0 = δ1 = 0 and pi0 ≥ 4: Let for
example pi0 = 4 then argmax{v0(δ′0) − pi> f0(δ′0) | δ′0 ∈ D0} = arg max{4δ′0 − 4δ′0 | δ′0 ∈ [0,1]} =
[0, 1] 3 δ0 and ker f1 = {0} 3 δ1. Note that this solution is not a competitive equilibrium because at
price four the optimal strategy of the seller is to sell exactly two units instead of selling nothing.
In example 19 the model cut off the welfare maximizing solution and return a solution that satisfies
δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = 0 and pi0 ≥ 6.
In general we cannot find a competitive equilibrium, but we can find strict linear prices where the
decision variables of all convex bids are profit maximizing:
Corollary 20. Let T be the set of commodities without the numéraire and let (gi , vi , fi) be the bid param-
eters of convex bids i ∈ IC and (Di , vi , fi) the bid parameters of non-convex bids i ∈ IN .
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Let δ∗ be an optimal solution to
max
∑
i∈I
vi(δi), (MaxWelfare)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
fi,t(δi) = 0 ∀t ∈ T , (42)
gi(δi)≤ 0 ∀i ∈ IC , (43)
δi ∈ Di ∀i ∈ IN . (44)
Let the weak Slater assumption hold for
∑
i∈IC fi(δi) = −
∑
i∈IN fi(δ
∗
i ) and ∀i ∈ IC : gi(δi) ≤ 0. The
assumption holds if for example all convex decision sets are polyhedrons. Then there exists pi ∈ RT with
δ∗i ∈ argmax{vi(δi)−pi> fi(δi) | gi(δi)≤ 0} ∀i ∈ IC .
In other words: for all i ∈ IC there exists pi and µi with
µ>i gi(δ∗i ) = 0 ∧ µ>i D gi(δ∗i ) = D vi(δ∗i )−pi>D fi(δ∗i ) ∧ µi ≥ 0.
Proof. Let δ∗ be an optimal solution. We will replace all non-convex bids by “constant” convex bids,
such that the fundamental welfare theorem yields the desired result. For all i ∈ IN let D∗i = {δ∗i },
f ∗i (δ) = fi(δ∗), and v∗i (δ) = vi(δ∗). Each bid (D∗i , v∗i , f ∗i ) is convex, as the decision set is a singleton
and the decision valuation and the quantity function are constant functions. If we replace all non-
convex bids by these constant bids, then δ∗ is still an optimal solution to the modified problem. As the
modified problem is a convex auction, we can apply the fundamental welfare theorem.
In the following we present an algorithm that exploits this property and ensures the optimality con-
ditions without modeling them explicitly. Similar to the generalized Benders decomposition (Geoffrion
(1972)), the algorithm decomposes the problem into a master problem and a subproblem. Readers
who are not interested in algorithmic details can safely skip the rest of this subsection.
In our applications the individual optimization problems of non-convex bids are bounded mixed
integer programs, that is, the decision valuations and the quantity functions are affine linear functions
and the decision sets are feasible regions of bounded mixed integer programs. In our case these mixed
integer programs are very small such that we can specify the polyhedral convex hull of each non-convex
decision set. This property is crucial for the algorithm and points out an important computational
limitation.
For the sake of exposition we will focus only on mixed integer auctions. In a mixed integer auction
all bids are either convex or mixed integer bids. Mixed integer bids are introduced in
Definition 21. Let T be the set of commodities without the numéraire. A bid i with parameters (Di , vi , fi)
is a mixed integer bid if Di is bounded and there exist parameters ((Ai , ai , zi), ci ,Q i) with
vi(δi) = c
>
i δi , fi(δi) =Q iδi , Di = {δi ∈ Rni−zi ×Zzi | Aiδi ≤ ai}, and zi ≥ 1.
The price parameterized individual optimization problem is given by
max c>i δi −pi>Q iδi , (MIBid)(pi)
s.t. Aiδi ≤ ai , (45)
δi ∈ Rni−zi ×Zzi . (46)
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Theorem 22. Let vi(δi) = c>i δi , fi(δi) = Q iδi , Di ⊆ Rn bounded, and let conv(Di) = {δi ∈ Rn | Aiδi ≤
ai}. Then
δ∗i ∈ argmax{c>i δi −pi>Q iδi | δi ∈ Di} ∪ {0}
if and only if there exists λ∗i such that
δ∗i ∈ argmax{c>i δi −pi>Q iδi | Aiδi ≤ λ∗i ai},
δ∗i ∈ Di ∪ {0},
λ∗i ∈ {0,1}.
Lemma 23. Let D ⊆ Rn and c ∈ Rn. Then
argmax{c>δ | δ ∈ D}= argmax{c>δ | δ ∈ conv D} ∩ D.
Lemma 24. Let X = {x ∈ Rn | Ax ≤ a} be a bounded polyhedron (i.e., a polytope). Then
X ∪ {0}= {x ∈ Rn | Ax ≤ λa,λ ∈ {0,1}}.
This is also true if we parameterize X : Let µ ∈ Rm and X (µ) = {x ∈ Rn | A(µ)x ≤ a(µ)} be a bounded
parameterized polytope, then
X (µ)∪ {0}= {x ∈ Rn | A(µ)x ≤ λa(µ),λ ∈ {0,1}}.
Proof. Confer Balas (1979).
Proof of Theorem 22.. For overview purposes we will omit the indices i. Recall that pi is exogenously
given. If D is empty, then the theorem is trivial. Let D be non-empty.
arg max{c>δ−pi>Qδ | δ ∈ D} ∪ {0} | Lemma 23
=

argmax{c>δ−pi>Qδ | δ ∈ conv(D)} ∩ D∪ {0} | (A∩ D)∪ N = (A∪ N)∩ (D ∪ N)
=

argmax{c>δ−pi>Qδ | Aδ ≤ a} ∪ {0}∩ (D ∪ {0}) | KKT conditions
=

δ |
∃µ≥ 0 with
A>µ= c−Q>pi
(Aδ− a)>µ= 0
Aδ ≤ a
∪ {δ | δ = 0}
∩ (D ∪ {0}) = . . .
The set D is bounded, thus {δ | Aδ ≤ a} is bounded and therefore X (µ) = {δ | Aδ ≤ a, (µ>A)δ = (µ>a)}
is a bounded polyhedron for all µ ≥ 0. Let P(pi) = max{c>δ−pi>Qδ | Aδ ≤ a} and P ′(pi) = {µ ≥ 0 |
A>µ= c−Q>pi}. We know that P(pi) has a finite optimal solution for all pi ∈ RT and the strong duality
yields that P ′(pi) has a solution for all pi ∈ RT .
. . .=
 {δ | ∃µ : µ ∈ P ′(pi),δ ∈ X (µ)} ∪ {δ | ∃µ : µ ∈ P ′(pi),δ ∈ {0}}∩ (D ∪ {0})
=

δ | ∃µ : µ ∈ P ′(pi),δ ∈ (X (µ)∪ {0})	∩ (D ∪ {0})
=

δ | ∃µ : µ ∈ P ′(pi),δ ∈ (X (µ)∪ {0}),δ ∈ (D ∪ {0})	= . . .
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Lemma 24 yields that X (µ)∪ {0}= {δ | ∃λ ∈ {0, 1} : Aδ ≤ λa, (µ>A)δ = λ(µ>a)} for all µ.
· · ·=

δ |
∃λ,µ with
µ≥ 0
A>µ= c−Q>pi
λ ∈ {0,1}
(Aδ−λa)>µ= 0
Aδ ≤ λa
δ ∈ D ∪ {0}

.
We will now describe the algorithm step by step. Given a mixed integer auction, the algorithm
finds an optimal solution to (MainMPEC). It computes the optimal solution by solving a sequence of
relaxations. These relaxations omit the optimality conditions, such that each relaxation is a mixed
integer convex program, a MICP. The algorithm requires that for each mixed integer bid the convex hull
of the decision set is given. For Λ∗ ⊆ {0,1}IN consider the Λ∗-parameterized optimization problem
max
∑
i∈I
vi(δi), (MasterMICP)(Λ∗)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
fi,t(δi) = 0 ∀t ∈ T , (47)
gi(δi)≤ 0 ∀i ∈ IC , (48)
Aiδi ≤ λiai ∀i ∈ IN , (49)
δi ∈ Rni−zi ×Zzi ∀i ∈ IN , (50)
λ ∈ Λ∗, (51)
where T is the set of commodities without the numéraire, all i ∈ IC are convex bids with parameters
(gi , vi , fi), and all i ∈ IN are mixed integer bids with parameters ((Ai , ai , zi), ci ,Q i). The binary variable
λi models whether a non-convex bid i is rejected or not (cf. Theorem 22).
Assumption 25. In the rest of this chapter we always assume the following:
For all mixed integer bids i ∈ IN we have conv(Di) = {δi | Aiδi ≤ ai} and for all convex bids i ∈ I the
decision set Di is bounded. For all λ ∈ {0, 1}IN the weak slater assumption holds for (47)-(49).
(For example, the last assumption holds if there is a feasible solution δ∗ to (47)-(48) with gi(δ∗i ) < 0
for all i ∈ IC and 0= δi ∈ Di for all i ∈ IN .)
In the first step, the algorithm computes an optimal solution (δ∗,λ∗) to (MasterMICP)({0,1}IN ).
Without loss of generality, we may assume that λ∗i = 1 for all i ∈ IN . Note that if we fix all λi
to 1, then the previous model is equivalent to the (MaxWelfare) model in Corollary 20. In other
words (δ∗,λ∗) is a welfare maximizing solution. Observe that whenever (δ∗,λ∗) is an optimal solu-
tion to (MasterMICP)(Λ∗), we can apply Corollary 20. This becomes clear if we use parameterized
decision sets D′i(λ∗) in the (MaxWelfare) model: for all non-convex bids i ∈ IN use D′i(λ∗) := {δi |
δi satisfies (49) and (50)} instead of Di .
In the next step, a linear program checks whether there exists a strict linear pricing schedule pi,
such that (δ∗,pi) is feasible for (MainMPEC). In other words, the program checks whether there exists
a strict linear pricing schedule such that all convex bids are profit maximizing and all non-convex bids
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are either profit maximizing or rejected. Theorem 22 provides, that it is sufficient to check whether
there is a pricing schedule pi such that
δ∗i ∈ arg max{vi(δi)−pi> fi(δi) | gi(δi)≤ 0} ∀i ∈ IC and (52)
δ∗i ∈ arg max{c>i δi −pi>Q iδi | Aiδi ≤ λ∗i ai} ∀i ∈ IN . (53)
According to Corollary 20 there is a strict linear pricing schedule such that all convex bids are profit
maximizing, i.e., such that the first equation holds. Recall that the welfare maximizing solution does
not necessarily possess a pricing schedule that satisfies both equations (cf. Example 19).
We use the KKT conditions to reformulate equations (52) and (53). The objective of the following
program is zero if and only if there exists a pi such that the two equations hold. This will be discussed
in the following two paragraphs.
min −∑
i∈IN
µ>i (Aiδ∗i −λ∗i ai), (PriceLP)(δ∗,λ∗)
s.t. µ>i gi(δ∗i ) = 0 ∀i ∈ IC , (54)
µ>i D gi(δ∗i ) = D vi(δ∗i )−pi>D fi(δ∗i ) ∀i ∈ IC , (55)
µi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ IC , (56)
µ>i Ai = c>i −pi>Q i ∀i ∈ IN , (57)
µi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ IN . (58)
In this model the terms δ∗ and λ∗ are exogenously given parameters, whereas the terms pi and µ are the
variables. Observe that the model is a linear program. The term pi represents a strict linear price vector
and µi corresponds to the dual variables of the price parameterized convex optimization problems (52)
and (53).
The following paragraph shows that (PriceLP)(δ∗,λ∗) is feasible and the objective equals zero if and
only if there is a pi with (52) and (53). Recall that (δ∗,λ∗) is an optimal solution to (MasterMICP)(Λ∗).
This allows us to apply Corollary 20, which yields that there exists µ and pi such that the constraints
(54)-(56) are satisfied. Note that these three constraints are the complementarity condition and the
dual feasibility of (52). It remains to be checked that for a given pi the constraints (57)-(58) are
feasible. Note that these two constraints correspond to the dual feasibility of the price parameterized
linear programs in (53). The definition of mixed integer bids ensures that the feasible regions of these
linear programs are bounded, thus they have a finite optimal solution for all pi. Therefore, the dual
problems of (53) are feasible for all pi. Since the last two constraints correspond to the dual feasibility
of (53), for all pi there exists µ such that they are satisfied. Note that the objective of (PriceLP)(δ∗,λ∗)
corresponds to the complementarity conditions of (53). Therefore, the objective is zero if and only if
there exists a pi with (52) and (53).
Even though the model (PriceLP)(δ∗,λ∗) depends on the parameters δ∗ and λ∗, under certain
conditions it is actually independent of the particular choice of δ∗:
Proposition 26. Let Λ∗ ⊆ {0, 1}IN and let (δ∗,λ∗) and (δ′,λ∗) be optimal solutions to (MasterMICP)(Λ∗).
If the optimal objective value of (PriceLP)(δ∗,λ∗) is zero, then the optimal objective of (PriceLP)(δ′,λ∗)
is zero and the sets of optimal solutions of both problems coincide.
Proof. Let (δ∗,λ∗) and (δ′,λ∗) be optimal solutions to (MasterMICP)(Λ∗), then δ∗ and δ′ are optimal
solutions to (MasterMICP)({λ∗}). Let the optimal objective value of (PriceLP)(δ∗,λ∗) be zero. Then
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there is a pi with (52) and (53). Furthermore, δ∗ satisfies the clearing condition
∑
i∈I fi(δ∗i ) = 0, as it
is a feasible solution to (MasterMICP)(Λ∗). The fundamental welfare theorem yields that δ∗ maximizes
the convex program
max
∑
i∈I
vi(δi), (MasterCP)(λ∗)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
fi,t(δi) = 0 ∀t ∈ T , (59)
gi(δi)≤ 0 ∀i ∈ IC , (60)
Aiδi ≤ λ∗i ai ∀i ∈ IN . (61)
Note that (MasterCP)(λ∗) is the convex relaxation of (MasterMICP)({λ∗}). We know that∑i∈I vi(δ∗i ) =∑
i∈I vi(δ′i), as both solutions maximize (MasterMICP)({λ∗}). Therefore, δ′ maximizes (MasterCP)(λ∗).
This time, the fundamental welfare theorem yields that there is a pi with (52) and (53). In other words,
the objective of (PriceLP)(δ′,λ∗) is zero.
Recall that δ∗ and δ′ maximize (MasterCP)(λ∗). Proposition 35 provides that the set of dual solu-
tions that satisfy the KKT conditions of (MasterCP)(λ∗) is independent of the particular primal optimal
solution δ∗ or δ′. In other words, the set of optimal solutions to (PriceLP)(δ∗,λ∗) is equal to the set of
optimal solutions to (PriceLP)(δ′,λ∗).
The next paragraph explains the meaning of the set Λ. Recall that we want to solve (MainMPEC)
for a mixed integer auction. Theorem 22 provides the following reformulation:
max
∑
i∈I
vi(δi), (MainMPEC′)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
fi,t(δi) = 0 ∀t ∈ T , (62)
δi ∈ arg max{vi(δ′i)−pi> fi(δ′i) | gi(δ′i)≤ 0} ∀i ∈ IC , (63)
δi ∈ arg max{vi(δ′i)−pi> fi(δ′i) | Aiδ′i ≤ λiai} ∀i ∈ IN , (64)
δi ∈ Rni−zi ×Zzi ∀i ∈ IN , (65)
λ ∈ {0, 1}IN . (66)
Recall that the variables of this model are δ, λ, and pi. The fundamental welfare theorem provides
that there exists a pi such that δ satisfies (62)-(64) if and only if δ maximizes (MasterCP)(λ). In this
respect, the previous model is equivalent to:
max
∑
i∈I
vi(δi), (MainMPEC′′)
s.t. δ maximizes (MasterCP)(λ), (67)
δi ∈ Rni−zi ×Zzi ∀i ∈ IN , (68)
λ ∈ {0, 1}IN . (69)
Observe that the λ-part of a feasible solution to (MainMPEC′′) is in the set
Λ◦ := {λ ∈ {0,1}IN | (MasterCP)(λ) has an optimal solution that is mixed integral}
= {λ ∈ {0,1}IN | there is a δ that maximizes (MasterCP)(λ) and satisfies (68)}.
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The feasible region of (MainMPEC′′) remains unchanged if we restrict the variable λ to the set Λ◦,
i.e., replace λ ∈ {0,1}IN by λ ∈ Λ◦. The fundamental welfare theorem yields that this also applies to
(MainMPEC′). The following two lemmas will allow us to transform the bilevel program into a program
with just one level.
Lemma 27. Let f : Rn → R and X , Y ⊆ Rn. If max{ f (x) | x ∈ X } has an optimal solution x∗ with
x∗ ∈ Y , then 
arg max f (x)
s.t. x ∈ X ∩ Y

=

argmax f (x)
s.t. x ∈ X

∩ Y.
Lemma 28. Let f : Rn → R, Y ⊆ Rm, and for all y ∈ Y let X (y) ⊆ Rn. If for all y ∈ Y the program
max{ f (x) | x ∈ X (y)} has an optimal solution, then
argmax f (x)
s.t.
x ∈ arg max f (x)
s.t. x ∈ X (y)
y ∈ Y
=
argmax f (x)s.t. x ∈ X (y)
y ∈ Y
 .
The program (MainMPEC′′) is equivalent to (MasterMICP)(Λ◦)
max
∑
i∈I
vi(δi), (MasterMICP)(Λ◦)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
fi,t(δi) = 0 ∀t ∈ T , (70)
gi(δi)≤ 0 ∀i ∈ IC , (71)
Aiδi ≤ λiai ∀i ∈ IN , (72)
δi ∈ Rni−zi ×Zzi ∀i ∈ IN , (73)
λ ∈ Λ◦. (74)
Putting all together we obtain that (MainMPEC) is equivalent to (MasterMICP)(Λ◦). In other words,
there is a λ∗ such that (δ∗,λ∗)maximizes (MasterMICP)(Λ◦) if and only if there is a pi such that (δ∗,pi)
maximizes (MainMPEC).
Proposition 29. Let Λ∗ ⊆ {0,1}IN . If (δ∗,λ∗) maximizes (MasterMICP)(Λ∗) and the optimal objective
value of (PriceLP)(δ∗,λ∗) is non-zero then (MasterCP)(λ∗) has no optimal solution that is mixed integral,
i.e., λ∗ /∈ Λ◦.
Proof. The optimal objective of (PriceLP)(δ∗,λ∗) is zero if and only if there exist dual variables that
satisfy the KKT conditions. It follows that δ∗ is not an optimal solution to (MasterCP)(λ∗). Suppose that
there is an optimal solution δ′ to (MasterCP)(λ∗) that is mixed integral, then
∑
i∈I vi(δ∗)<
∑
i∈I vi(δ′).
The solution δ′ is also feasible to (MasterMICP)({λ∗}) and δ∗ maximizes (MasterMICP)({λ∗}), thus∑
i∈I vi(δ′)≤
∑
i∈I vi(δ∗). This is a contradiction.
Now we come to the next step of the algorithm. Recall that (δ∗,λ∗) is an optimal solution to
(MasterMICP)(Λ∗). Let (pi,µ) be an optimal solution to (PriceLP)(δ∗,λ∗). If the objective value is
zero, then (δ∗,pi) is an optimal solution to (MainMPEC) and we are finished. Otherwise we notice that
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λ∗ /∈ Λ◦, thus our set Λ∗ is to big. The previous proposition shows that we do not cut of any feasible
solution to (MasterMICP)(Λ∗) if we remove λ∗ from Λ∗. Therefore, we set Λ∗ ← Λ∗ \ {λ∗}, go back to
the first step and use the modified set Λ∗. If there exists a competitive equilibrium the algorithm finds
it in the first iteration. Otherwise it finds a bid selection λ∗, such that all selected mixed integer bids
(i.e., bids with λ∗i = 1) and all convex bids are profit maximizing. All rejected mixed integer bids (i.e.,
bis with λ∗i = 0) are not executed at all (δ∗i = 0). The algorithm terminates after a finite number of
steps, because Λ∗ is finite and the size of the set decreases in each step. The procedure is summarized
in Algorithm 4.1.
Algorithm 4.1 Exact algorithm for mixed integer auctions
Require: Instance of a mixed integer auction
Ensure: Optimal solution to (MainMPEC)
Λ∗← {0,1}IN
done← false
while ¬done do
(δ∗,λ∗)← solve (MasterMICP)(Λ∗)
(pi∗,µ∗)← solve parameterized model (PriceLP)(δ∗,λ∗)
if
∑
i∈IN µ
∗
i
>(Aiδ∗i −λ∗i ai) = 0

, then
// there exist prices such that no bid incurs a loss
done← true
else
// current solution is infeasible, reject it
Λ∗← Λ∗ \ {λ∗}
end if
end while
return (δ∗,pi∗)
The step Λ∗← Λ∗ \ {λ∗} can be implemented by adding the following cut to the model:∑
i∈IN :λ∗i=0
λi +
∑
i∈IN :λ∗i=1
(1−λi)≥ 1.
The exact algorithm should be combined with a heuristic. We obtain a fast heuristic if we use a more
aggressive cut instead of the previous one. Let L be the set of mixed integer bids that incur a loss in the
current iteration, then a heuristic cut is given by∑
i∈L
λi ≤ |L| − 1, where L := {i ∈ IN | µ∗i >(Aiδ∗i −λ∗i ai)< 0}.
4.2 Model B: Non-Negative Surplus
In Model A, non-convex bids are either surplus maximizing or rejected. This is a very mild relaxation
of a competitive equilibrium. However, if we consider non-trivial mixed integer bids, the model may
imply certain diseconomies.
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Figure 1: thick line and marked area: price-quantity combinations with a non-negative surplus.
Example 30. A participant i has a production plant. If the plant is used, then on the one hand start-up
costs of s = 30€ arise and on the other hand marginal costs of m = 10€/unit arise for each produced
unit. The variable δi,1 ∈ {0,1} models whether the plant is used or not and δi,2 ∈ [0, u] models the
produced quantity which is limited to u = 50 units. The price parameterized optimization problem is
as follows:
max vi(δi)−pi> fi(δi)
s.t. δi ∈ Di

=
max −(s, m)>δi −pi>(−1)δi,2s.t. δi,1 ∈ {0,1}
0≤ δi,2 ≤ uδi,1
 , (SellBid)(pi)
where pi ∈ R is the exogenously given price. Recall that negative quantities denote production. For
this reason the objective contains the additional minus signs. The producer receives −pi> fi(δi) = piδi,2
Euro for the production of δi,2 units. The production costs are covered if
vi(δi)−pi> fi(δi)≥ 0. ⇔ piδi,2− sδi,1−mδi,2 ≥ 0 (75)
If δi,2 > 0, this boils down to pi ≥ m+ s/δi,2 = 10+ 30/δi,2. If δi,2 = 0, the inequality yields δi,1 = 0.
The blue area and the blue line in Figure 1 depict the price-quantity combinations (pi,δi,2) where
inequality (75) holds. In Model A the decision variable δi of a mixed integer bid either maximizes the
individual optimization problem or it is zero, that is,
δi ∈ argmax{vi(δ′i)−pi> fi(δ′i) | δ′i ∈ Di} ∪ {0}. (76)
The blue lines in Figure 2 depict the price-quantity combinations that satisfy equation this equation.
We can see that the blue area in this Figure is significantly smaller than in the previous Figure.
Now assume that there is a convex demand bid j. The marginal willingness to pay amounts to
20€/unit and the maximal demanded quantity amounts to 40 units. The individual optimization
problem is as follows:
max v j(δ j)−pi> f j(δ j)
s.t. δ j ∈ D j

=

max 20δ j −pi>δ j
s.t. δ j ∈ [0,40]

, (BuyBid)(pi)
21
10 20 30 40
50
50
100
m=
u=
price
quantity
Figure 2: thick lines: quantities are either zero or maximize (SellBid)(pi).
In Model A the sell bid either produces nothing or 50 units (cf. Figure 2). Therefore, the buy bid
cannot be executed, because buys at most 40 units. Model A ends up with an economic surplus of
zero Euro. If we replace the equation (76) by the less restrictive constraint (75), the following solution
becomes feasible: δi = (1,40), δ j = 40, and pi = 15. The solution generates an economic surplus of
20 · 40− 30− 10 · 40 = 370 Euro. The sell bid i has a non-negative surplus of 15 · 40− 30− 10 · 40 =
170 Euro and the decision variable δi is feasible for (SellBid)(pi). The buy bid j has a surplus of
20 · 40− 15 · 40= 200 Euro and the decision variable δ j maximizes (BuyBid)(pi).
The example shows that it may be disadvantageous to enforce constraint (76). This is done in Model
A, which computes the trivial zero solution in the previous example. No bid is executed, even though
there exists a solution where both participants have a strictly positive surplus. This is not desirable. To
address this issue, one can consider the following relaxation of (MainMPEC).
max
∑
i∈I
vi(δi), (77)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
fi,t(δi) = 0 ∀t ∈ T , (78)
δi ∈ argmax{vi(δ′i)−pi> fi(δ′i) | δ′i ∈ Di} ∀i ∈ IC , (79)
δi ∈ Di and vi(δi)−pi> fi(δi)≥ 0 ∀i ∈ IN . (80)
This model ensures that the decision variables of each convex bid maximize the individual surplus and
the decision variables of each non-convex bid are feasible and the associated surplus is non-negative.
Similar to constraint (76) in model (MainMPEC), constraint (79) may lead to unfavorable solutions.
Model (77)-(80) may compute the trivial zero solution, even if there exists a solution where all partici-
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pants have a strictly positive surplus. These considerations lead to a further relaxation of (MainMPEC).
max
∑
i∈I
vi(δi), (NoLoss)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
fi,t(δi) = 0 ∀t ∈ T ,
δi ∈ Di and vi(δi)−pi> fi(δi)≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I .
The model does not distinguish between convex and non-convex bids. It maximizes the economic
surplus subject to the clearing condition, the feasibility of the decision variables, and the guarantee
that no participant incurs a loss. Recall that δ and pi are the variables of the model. Therefore, the
non-negative surplus constraint is non-convex, thus it is difficult to handle.
In the following paragraph we show that the diseconomies described above do not arise in the
model (NoLoss). Therefore, we introduce an efficiency term that characterizes economically desirable
solutions and takes the strict linear prices into account.
Definition 31. A tuple (δ∗,pi∗) is an efficient solution to the multicriteria optimization problem
max
 v1(δ1)−pi
> f1(δ1)
...
v|I |(δ|I |)−pi> f|I |(δ|I |)
 (Multi)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
fi,t(δi) = 0 ∀t ∈ T ,
δi ∈ Di ∀i ∈ I ,
pit ∈ R ∀t ∈ T
if there is no other feasible solution (δ,pi) to (Multi) with
vi(δi)−pi> fi(δi)≥ vi(δ∗i )−pi∗> fi(δ∗i ) for all i ∈ I and (81)
vi(δi)−pi> fi(δi)> vi(δ∗i )−pi∗> fi(δ∗i ) for some i ∈ I . (82)
In other words, (δ∗,pi∗) is an efficient solution to (Multi) if the surplus of a participant cannot be increased
without decreasing the surplus of another participant.
Proposition 32. An optimal solution to (NoLoss) is an efficient solution to (Multi).
Proof. Let (δ∗,pi∗) be an optimal solution to (NoLoss). At this solution the surplus of each participant
i ∈ I is non-negative: vi(δ∗i )−pi∗> fi(δ∗i )≥ 0. Assume that there is a feasible solution (δ,pi) to (Multi)
with (81) and (82). Equation (81) yields
vi(δi)−pi> fi(δi)≥ vi(δ∗i )−pi∗> fi(δ∗i )≥ 0 for all i ∈ I .
In other words, (δ,pi) is also a feasible solution to (NoLoss). We will now compare the objective values
of both solutions.∑
i∈I
vi(δi) =
∑
i∈I

vi(δi)−pi> fi(δi)

>︷ ︸︸ ︷
(81) and (82)
∑
i∈I

vi(δ
∗
i )−pi∗> fi(δ∗i )

=
∑
i∈I
vi(δ
∗
i ).
This is a contradiction, because (δ∗,pi∗) maximizes (NoLoss). The objective value of (δ,pi) cannot be
strictly greater than the objective value of (δ∗,pi∗).
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An optimal solution to (NoLoss) is an allocation that maximizes the economic surplus such that
there exists a strict linear pricing schedule where no participant incurs a loss. It is not possible to in-
crease the surplus of one participant without decreasing the surplus of another participant. In particular
any allocation with a higher economic surplus requires the use of another pricing schedule, because
otherwise at least one participant incurs a loss. Due to these properties we call an optimal solution to
(NoLoss) a strict linear price equilibrium.
4.3 Read-World Application
The previous models and algorithms are motivated by a real-world application. In our previous paper
(Martin et al. (2013)) we modeled the European day-ahead electricity auction and developed an exact
algorithm and a heuristic for this specific auction. The electricity auction model is similar to model (77)-
(80). Even though the algorithms in Martin et al. (2013) are designed to solve the specific electricity
auction problem, they can be generalized. The generalized algorithms can solve Model A for arbitrary
mixed integer auctions (cf. Algorithm 4.1 in Section 4.1). Note that in general Model A differs from
(77)-(80), and therefore, does not reflect all requirements of the electricity auction. However, the
specialized algorithms in Martin et al. (2013) are similar to the ones in this paper. They are applicable
to large scale real-world electricity auctions and produce high quality solutions in a short time.
5 Summary and Outlook
The article presents two relaxations of a competitive equilibrium in general auctions. For the first relax-
ation (MainMPEC) we constructed an exact algorithm and a heuristic. Both algorithms are applicable
to mixed integer auctions. Even though the first relaxation has desirable algorithmic properties, we
showed that an optimal solution might not be efficient from an economical point of view: there exist
situations, where all participants can be made better off. Such an improvement can be achieved if we
replace all optimality conditions by the condition that no participant may incur a loss. This leads us to
the second relaxation (NoLoss), which maximizes the economic surplus such that no participant incurs
a loss. A solution to this model turns out to be efficient: no participant can be made better off without
making another one worse off. The second relaxation is economically preferable, but the algorithms
for the first relaxation, only provide heuristic solutions to the second relaxation. Further research could
be concerned about algorithms that can solve large scale mixed integer auction instances of the second
relaxation.
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Appendix A. Convex Optimization
In this section we shortly introduce some basic definitions and results concerning convex optimization.
Consider the convex optimization problem
max v(x), (A.1)
s.t. fi(x) = 0 i = 1, . . . , k, (A.2)
gi(x)≤ 0 i = 1, . . . , m, (A.3)
where v, fi , gi : Rn → R are differentiable functions, v concave, gi convex, and fi affine. To describe
optimal solutions to this problem it is convenient to assume that the weak Slater assumption holds.
Hiriart-Urruty & Lemaréchal (1993) provide the following definition:
Definition 33. The constraints (A.2)-(A.3) satisfy the weak Slater assumption if there is a feasible point
at which all the non-affine constraints are strictly satisfied, i.e., there exists xˆ ∈ Rn with
fi( xˆ) = 0 i = 1, . . . , k,
gi( xˆ)≤ 0 i = 1, . . . , m and gi is affine,
gi( xˆ)< 0 i = 1, . . . , m and gi is non-affine.
With this assumption the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, short KKT conditions, are necessary and
sufficient to describe an optimal solution to our convex problem:
Theorem 34 (KKT for differentiable convex problems). Let v, fi , gi : Rn → R be differentiable func-
tions, v concave, gi convex, and fi affine. If for x¯ , p¯i, λ¯ the KKT conditions
fi( x¯) = 0 i = 1, . . . , k, (A.4)
gi( x¯)≤ 0 i = 1, . . . , m, (A.5)
k∑
i=1
p¯ii
∂ fi
∂ x j
( x¯) +
m∑
i=1
λ¯i
∂ gi
∂ x j
( x¯) =
∂ v
∂ x j
( x¯) j = 1, . . . , n, (A.6)
λ¯i ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . , m, (A.7)
λ¯i gi( x¯) = 0 i = 1, . . . , m, (A.8)
hold, then x¯ is primal optimal and (p¯i, λ¯) dual optimal for (A.1)-(A.3). If x¯ is primal optimal and the
weak Slater assumption holds, then there exists (p¯i, λ¯) such that the KKT conditions are satisfied.
Proof. Confer Theorem VII.2.1.4 and VII.2.2.5 in Hiriart-Urruty & Lemaréchal (1993) or Chapter 5.5.3
in Boyd & Vandenberghe (2004).
Proposition 35. Let v, fi , gi : Rn→ R be differentiable functions, v concave, gi convex, and fi affine. Let x¯
and x¯ ′ be optimal solutions to (A.1)-(A.3) and let M( x¯) := {(p¯i, λ¯) | (A.6)−(A.8)}. Then M( x¯) = M( x¯ ′).
Proof. Confer Proposition VII.3.3.1 in Hiriart-Urruty & Lemaréchal (1993).
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